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    Abstract: This paper compares patterns of hiring and separations in regulated and 
unregulated labor markets over the last two decades in Brazil, with an eye toward 
gauging the effects of employment protection on employment adjustment over the 
business cycle. Since the difference between the sectors is stark and well-defined, the 
consequences of employment protection on flows through the labor market are relatively 
easy to discern. Employment protection causes adjustment to demand fluctuations to 
come at the expense of the unemployed. A reduction in employment in the regulated 
labor market is achieved by lowering the rate at which the unemployed get jobs. In the 
unregulated market, the same reduction is achieved by raising the separation rate. In 
principle, the restructuring mechanisms of both sectors could be compatible with similar 
contributions to unemployment. In practice, contributions from the regulated sector are 
more persistent and erratic. The contribution of the unregulated sector is stable and 
countercyclical. 
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I. Introduction 
 
    In recent years, macroeconomic theorists have made great strides in clarifying the 
channels through which institutional constraints are thought to affect labor markets. One 
strand of this literature, attributable to Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996a, 1996b, 
1998, 2000), has its origins in a view of recessions as “cleansing” episodes and has 
evolved into a general theory of the macroeconomic consequences of transactional 
impediments in productive relationships. Caballero and Hammour have used this 
framework to examine the consequences of institutional constraints for patterns of 
creative destruction in steady state, over the business cycle, and during episodes of major 
restructuring. Another strand of the literature, associated with Mortensen and Pissarides 
(e.g., 1994, 1999) and Olivier Blanchard with various co-authors (e.g., Blanchard and 
Diamond 1992, Blanchard 2000, Blanchard and Portugal 2001) evolved out of the search-
theoretic approach to labor markets and has incorporated an institutional focus in more 
recent incarnations. 
    The empirical work on this topic, however, lags behind, notwithstanding a rapidly 
expanding literature investigating patterns of job creation and destruction in a growing 
list of countries. There are good reasons for this. First, the theoretical work delivers its 
most salient predictions in terms of flows of workers and jobs between various states of 
the labor market – flows that are observed with notorious imprecision. Second, while 
institutional constraints are easily conceived of in theory, the concept is much harder to 
pin down empirically. Comparing labor flow patterns across institutional environments is 
therefore an inherently messy business, which has left a gulf between the theoretical and 
empirical research that has yet to be bridged. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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    This paper attempts to circumvent some of these difficulties by comparing two labor 
markets with extremely stark and well-defined institutional differences – regulated and 
unregulated labor markets in Brazil. Latin American labor markets are typically highly 
regulated, and Brazil is no exception. According to an index of job security costs 
calculated by Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000), labor markets in Latin America are more 
regulated even than most European labor markets. On the other hand, almost half of 
Brazil's labor force works in the informal sector, free of any regulatory constraints. This 
paper makes use of a unique, two-decade, rotating panel of Brazilian households to 
compare labor reallocation in each sector over the business cycle. 
    One goal of this paper is to connect the empirical analysis more closely with 
theoretical work. To this end, the paper extends a simple bargaining model developed in 
Blanchard and Portugal (1998) and Blanchard (2000) (a static version of a model by 
Blanchard and Portugal, 2001) to illustrate the differential effect of demand shocks on 
labor market flows in regulated and unregulated markets. Job-specific costs have three 
effects in this model. They lower the wage that firms can pay, they increase the 
bargaining power of workers, and they lower the separation rate. In order to make the 
lower wage consistent with workers’ increased demands, firms must lower the hiring rate. 
Furthermore, the lower the equilibrium level of the hiring rate, the more demand shocks 
are absorbed on the hiring margin. 
    The empirical analysis makes use of the steady state employment condition to develop 
a test of the extent to which a given employment change is achieved on the hiring and 
separation margins. This approach implicitly views restructuring as taking place on a 
continuum, on one side of which only the hiring rate adjusts and on the other side of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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which only the separation rate adjusts. The regulatory environment and, more generally, 
the specificity of assets embedded in employment relationships, determine where on the 
continuum a labor market lies. This is a slightly different emphasis from much of the 
literature on labor market flows, which for the most part focuses on how inflows and 
outflows from jobs diverge to achieve a net change in employment. This paper takes 
flows into and out of jobs to be approximately equal at any point in time and focuses on 
adjustments to the hiring and separation rates over the business cycle. This is not to say 
that inflows and outflows do not diverge. Clearly they must if any change in employment 
is to occur. But empirically, the great majority of variation in inflows and outflows are 
“explained” by changes in hiring and separation rates, rather than deviations of hiring and 
separations from each other. Moreover, the exit rate from unemployment and the 
separation rate from jobs figure very prominently in theoretical work. 
    The results suggest that the regulated and unregulated labor markets lie on opposite 
ends of the restructuring continuum, that is, the unregulated labor market relies almost 
exclusively on the separation rate as an adjustment mechanism while the regulated labor 
market adjusts the hiring rate. Interestingly, separate regressions by 1-digit industry and 
by proxies for specific human capital do not change the basic result. 
    The paper then asks what effect the different restructuring mechanisms have had on the 
evolution of Brazilian unemployment. Although the equilibrium effects of institutional 
rigidity on unemployment are theoretically ambiguous, there are reasons to believe that 
institutions may affect the time it takes for a labor market to return to equilibrium after a 
shock, for example, because workers lose skills the longer they are unemployed or 
because firms discriminate against workers on the basis of the time they have spent in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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unemployment. Hence, a given shock may have longer-lasting effects on unemployment. 
This argument is a major candidate in the quest to explain the evolution of European 
unemployment. I use a Markov process first to predict movements in unemployment, and 
then to isolate the contributions of the regulated and unregulated labor markets on 
changes in the unemployment rate. The results suggest that changes in unemployment 
attributable to the formal sector are more persistent and less cyclical than unemployment 
generated by the informal sector. 
    There are very few papers that have compared labor reallocation across institutional 
lines. The most recent and cleanest evidence comes from Blanchard and Portugal (2001) 
who compare job and worker flows in Portugal and the U.S. They find that flows through 
unemployment in Portugal are much lower than in the U.S., and they attribute the 
difference to employment protection laws. However, their paper looks only at long-run 
implications of employment protection. Several papers have looked at cyclical properties 
of job and worker flows, although few have compared patterns in different institutional 
environments. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), find that job destruction is much more 
volatile than job creation over the U.S. business cycle. Caballero and Hammour (1994) fit 
a model to the same data and attribute this finding to convex adjustment costs of job 
creation. Firms smooth hiring across the business cycle, so employment adjustment has to 
occur on the job destruction margin. Using worker flows, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) 
also find that accessions are much less volatile than separations. Baldwin et al (1998) 
compare job creation and destruction in Canada and the United States and find that they 
are qualitatively similar, although job destruction is less volatile over the business cycle 
in Canada. Burda and Wyplosz (1994) cast doubt on the notion that European labor William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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markets have lower rates of restructuring than the U.S. They show that worker flows 
through unemployment in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom are similar 
to those observed in the United States, with both accessions and separations rising in 
recessions. In turn, Albæk and Sørensen (1998) cast some doubt on this finding. They use 
superior data to find that job destruction and creation in Denmark are roughly symmetric 
over the business cycle, while quits are strongly procyclical. 
    Brazil presents an interesting case for the study of job creation and destruction. The 
coexistence of fairly high job-specific costs to employers and extremely high rates of job 
turnover in the formal sector is something of a puzzle from the perspective of existing 
theory. Gonzaga (1998), Bivar, Gonzaga, and Pazello (2000), and Corseuil et al (2002) 
have all documented very high rates of job turnover using a variety of data sources and 
methodologies. Gonzaga (1998) argues that Brazil’s labor laws perversely encourage 
high job turnover since workers who are fired are entitled not only to the balance of their 
personal “severance payment” account (which accumulates with a worker’s tenure on a 
formal sector job), but, in the case of unjust dismissals, an additional payment of 40% 
over and above what has accumulated in this account, payable by the employer. In 
practice, many workers simply sign away their right to the 40% fee in order to gain 
access to their severance payment account, after which they may look for other work or 
continue at the same job without a formal contract. The existing studies have used 
primarily firm- or establishment-level data to document job reallocation patterns. By 
using household-level data, this paper is able to examine labor flow patterns in both the 
formal and informal sectors over a long period of time, but at the cost of distinguishing 
between job and worker flows. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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    The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief background of 
Brazil's macroeconomic experience since 1982. Section III presents the model and uses it 
to motivate the empirical approach. Section IV discusses the data. Section V presents the 
evidence on labor flows. Section VI presents the evidence on each sector's contribution to 
changes in unemployment, and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Background 
    The past two decades have been difficult for Latin American labor markets. Mexico's 
1982 debt default drew the world's attention the external vulnerability of most countries 
in the region and aggravated inflation. In Brazil's case, the debt crisis ushered in a decade 
of unsuccessful attempts at stabilizing inflation by means of “heterodox” stabilization 
plans, which attempted to subdue inflation directly through price controls. The first, and 
most successful, heterodox stabilization plan was the Cruzado plan in 1986, which 
provided a significant, though short-lived, stimulus to the economy; however, since it did 
not address the underlying excess demand problem, it inevitably failed as price controls 
became more difficult to enforce, sparking a bout of even higher inflation. The Cruzado 
plan was followed by five more stabilization attempts, each less successful than the last. 
The end result was a hyperinflation. 
    After spending the 1980s avoiding the inevitable, most Latin American countries came 
around to a policy view in the early 1990s that gave priority to macroeconomic 
stabilization and (less inevitably) trade liberalization. Brazil began liberalizing trade in 
1990, eliminating export subsidies and reducing external tariffs from an average of 40 
percent to 13 percent over four years. Successful stabilization did not come until the Real William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Plan of 1994, which combined a nominal exchange rate anchor with cuts in government 
spending. For tradable goods industries, this was a double blow: trade liberalization put 
an end to the subsidies that firms in these industries had previously enjoyed and 
drastically lowered external tariffs, while stabilization required a period of extremely 
overvalued exchange rates. Thus, firms were suddenly forced to compete in world 
markets, and at a disastrously uncompetitive exchange rate. For the same reasons, and 
abstracting from the disabsorption that was supposed to occur to achieve external 
balance, stabilization and liberalization were also a tremendous boon to non-tradable 
goods industries, which suddenly faced cheaper import prices due to the greater 
purchasing power of their currencies and relaxed import restrictions. 
    These developments put enormous pressure on labor markets. Latin America started 
the 1990s with an excess demand for labor in the tradable goods sector. If there were no 
frictions in labor markets, wages in tradable goods industries would have fallen, inducing 
the excess labor to move to non-tradables until the resulting wage differential was 
eliminated. Adjustment on this scale would be onerous for even the most flexible of labor 
markets. Not surprisingly, therefore, unemployment and/or informal sector employment 
have increased in nearly all countries in the region. Brazil has experienced one of the 
largest movements of labor out of the manufacturing sector in Latin America. Despite the 
enormous outflow from manufacturing, however, unemployment has remained relatively 
contained (at least compared to other countries in the region). Although some of this 
apparent success is attributable to lower labor force participation, most of the labor 
flowing out of manufacturing has in fact been absorbed by the informal service sector, at 
least indirectly. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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    Figure 1 makes the point. Between 1986 and 1998, employment in formal-sector 
manufacturing jobs fell by more than half as a share of the labor force (Panel A). Most of 
the slack was taken up by the informal service sector, although unemployment (Panel B) 
also rose. The decline in formal manufacturing employment actually began well before 
the liberalization reforms were begun in the early 1990s. It appears that, in the Brazilian 
case, manufacturing really started to feel the pinch in the mid-1980s after the failure of 
the Cruzado Plan. A second point worth mentioning is that the transition of workers out 
of formal manufacturing jobs and into informal service sector jobs worked in reverse in 
the early days of the Cruzado Plan, as Brazil pulled out of the initial phase of the debt 
crisis. The share of employment in the informal service sector is thus almost the mirror 
image of the share in formal manufacturing employment. 
 
III. A Simple Model 
    Incorporating specific investments into a flow model of the labor market is not an easy 
task because the hiring and firing decisions have to be made endogenous. This essentially 
requires some sort of heterogeneity across jobs, and the predictions of the model will be 
sensitive to how this heterogeneity is specified. Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996a, 
1998) get a lot of mileage out of introducing heterogeneity in a very simple way: 
exogenous technological progress makes newer jobs more productive than older ones. 
The advantage of their approach is that, since there is a continuum of job productivities at 
any given time, there is no ambiguity about which jobs should be scrapped in a downturn 
– the oldest jobs should go. Whether they do or not depends critically on the institutional 
environment. A more general form of job heterogeneity is introduced by Blanchard and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Portugal (2001), who follow in the tradition of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999). 
Job heterogeneity is modeled by introducing shocks to productivity randomly drawn from 
a productivity distribution. Shocks arrive at an exogenous rate determined by a Poisson 
process. A negative productivity shock has unclear implications for any given job, since 
the size of the shock is of critical importance. Some shocks may not be large enough to 
warrant a dissolution of the match between a firm and a worker, especially when firing 
costs are involved. This makes out-of-steady-state predictions difficult; however, since 
Blanchard and Portugal are interested in the steady state implications of employment 
protection, the model works well for their purpose. 
    In this section, I develop a simple empirical model of the labor market with irreversible 
costs of job creation, drawing on Blanchard (2000). The model glosses over many 
theoretical fine points, but it has the advantage that it captures the basic intuition of the 
more sophisticated models quite well, and it is suggests a straightforward empirical test. I 
think of the economy as always being in steady state, that is, flows of workers into and 
out of employment are equal at all points in time. We are concerned with changes in 
steady state flows associated with changes in profitability. Clearly, inflows and outflows 
cannot always be equal if the economy is to accomplish any changes in employment. But 
these divergences are minor deviations from trends in the way flows relate to stocks at 
different points in the cycle. The empirical justification for this is that the time series 
patterns are quite similar whether we look at inflows or outflows from jobs. The 
theoretical justification is that it buys a lot of simplicity. 
    Consider a labor force of size one. At any given time, workers can be in one of three 
states: formal employment (mf), informal employment (mk), and unemployment (u). Thus, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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1 = + + u m m k f  
Formal and informal employment are distinguished by the level of job-specific 
investment. Employment in the formal sector requires an investment on the part of the 
employer. This is addressed in greater detail below. 
    Workers are constantly entering and leaving each sector, even in equilibrium. For each 
sector of employment i, let hi denote the number of hires, and si the number of 
separations, where i=f,k. Hiring is determined by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching 
function, increasing in unemployment and vacancies, vi: 
η η − =
1
i i v u h  
Workers can only be hired from the unemployment pool, and employed workers can only 
leave their sector for unemployment; there are no direct transitions between formal and 
informal employment. Labor is homogeneous, so that the chance of an unemployed 
worker entering employment in each sector is simply the number of hires relative to the 
unemployed. This is alternately referred to as the hiring rate or the exit rate from 
unemployment, denoted xui. Similarly, the chance of a vacancy getting filled, xvi, is the 
number of hires relative to the stock of vacancies in each sector: 
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The ratio vi/u (or equivalently, 
2 / ui vi ui x x x = ) can be thought of as a measure of the 
tightness of labor market conditions in a given sector. A high number of vacancies 
relative to unemployed workers indicates that firms are having a relatively more difficult 
time filling vacancies than unemployed workers are having finding jobs. The parameter η William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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is a measure of firms’ aversion to unfilled vacancies. When η is high, a given increase in 
vacancies relative to unemployed workers results in a greater increase in the hiring rate. 
    The probability that a worker leaves employment for unemployment (equivalently, the 
separation rate) is given by: 
i
i
i m
s
= λ . 
In steady state, the flow of workers into each sector must equal the flow out of that 
sector: 
i i ui m u x × = × λ  
Solving for mi yields: 
 
 (1) 
Employment in a sector is equal to the inflow into that sector times the average duration 
of a job. Since all workers are assumed to have an equal chance of losing their job, the 
average job duration is equal to the inverse of the separation rate. 
Changes in steady state 
    Changes in mi can be achieved by changing the flow into employment or changing the 
average time an unemployed worker must wait to get a job, or any combination of the 
two. Taking the differential of the log of the steady state equation (1) yields: 
i ui i d u d x d m d λ ln ln ln ln − + =  
We are interested in the effect of institutional constraints on the margin of adjustment. To 
fix ideas, it is useful to consider some extreme cases. Consider first a sector that operates 
entirely on the “destruction” margin. That is, to achieve a change in employment, this 
.
1
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sector increases only the separation rate, keeping constant the duration of an 
unemployment spell ending in a job in that sector. In this case, 
0 ln ln 0 ln = − ⇒ = u d h d x d i ui  
In steady state, hiring and separations are equal, which implies that: 
i i i m d u d d u d s d ln ln ln ln ln − = ⇒ = λ  
If the hiring rate is constant, a negative shock to employment requires an increase in the 
separation rate equal in absolute magnitude to the proportional change in unemployment 
plus the proportional change in employment. 
    Now, consider the opposite case: a sector that operates entirely on the “creation” 
margin. A change in employment will be achieved by changing only the hiring rate, 
keeping the separation rate constant. 
0 ln ln 0 ln = − ⇒ = i i i m d s d d λ  
Again, the equality of hiring and separations implies that: 
u d m d x d m d h d i ui i i ln ln ln ln ln − = ⇒ =  
Thus, if the separation rate is constant, a negative shock must be accommodated by a fall 
in the hiring rate. The change is of the same magnitude as the change in the separation 
rate if the hiring rate is held constant. 
    In between these extremes, a sector may adjust with any combination of changes in  
destruction and creation. We can capture this in the following way: 
) ln ln )( 1 ( ln
) ln ln ( ln
u d m d d
u d m d x d
i i
i ui
− − − =
− =
β λ
β
     (2) 
Solving either of the equations in (2) for hiring and separations, we get: 
 (3)  u d m d s d h d i i i ln ) 1 ( ln ln ln β β − + = =William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Thus, β measures the extent to which adjustment takes place on the creation margin. 
Mathematically, there is no reason why β should be confined to the interval [0,1]. For 
example, it is possible that a negative shock would increase unemployment duration by 
so much that the flow into unemployment could actually fall. Theoretically, however, it 
would be difficult to motivate such a reaction. 
 
Institutional Rigidity 
    The formal sector differs from the informal sector in several respects. Workers with 
formal labor contracts accumulate funds in a personal account (Fundo de Garantía por 
Tempo de Serviço, or FGTS), which may be drawn upon when a worker is fired or upon 
retirement. Furthermore, if a worker is fired with unjust cause after more than three 
months of work, employers are required to pay a severance payment equal to 40% of the 
worker’s FGTS balance. In addition, workers have recourse to the legal system for unjust 
dismissals, almost all formal sector jobs are unionized, and jobs are more likely to 
involve training costs and specific skills. Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000) estimate that 
Brazil ranks above Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany in terms of costs associated 
with job security. However, Gonzaga (1998) has argued that these costs are at least 
partially reduced by direct negotiations between employers and employees. In the 
informal sector, the only institutional rigidities that might arise are through training or 
other specific human capital acquired on the job.
1 
                                                 
1 There is likely to be an interaction between institutional constraints imposed by regulation and those 
induced by specific human capital. The existence of a regulatory constraint may facilitate investments in 
job-specific human capital that might otherwise not have occurred. Note also that it may be desirable to 
facilitate investment in job-specific skills. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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    Here, the institutional setting is modeled simply as a fixed cost, c, that must be paid by 
the employer to the worker if a match is terminated. We assume that some portion of this 
cost cannot be bonded away, so that the Coase theorem does not hold. Since separations 
are costly, the separation rate is decreasing in c: 
 
Furthermore, since all matches will eventually come to an end, the zero-profit condition 
ensures that the separation cost also lowers the wage that firms can pay. This is called the 
feasible wage. Among other things, the feasible wage is also affected by demand 
conditions, reflected in the price of output, p. Denoting derivatives by superscripts, we 
have: 
() 0 , 0 ; , < > ⋅ =
c
i
p
i i
f
i c p w ϕ ϕ ϕ  
On the other hand, the rents associated with the employment relationship rise with the 
separation cost, since workers can walk away after firms have invested in the 
employment relationship. These rents must be bargained over, and the outcome of this 
bargaining is referred to as the bargained wage. For a given share of rents accruing to 
workers, the bargained wage rises with the separation cost. Furthermore, the share of the 
rents accruing to workers rises with the ease with which workers can find jobs relative to 
the ease with which firms can fill vacancies. Thus, for a given firing cost, the tighter is 
the labor market, the higher is the bargained wage: 
() () 0 , 0 ; , ; , /
/ 2 > > ⋅ = ⋅ =
c
i
x x
i ui i vi ui i
b
i
vi ui c x c x x w ψ ψ ψ ψ  
In equilibrium, the bargained wage equals the feasible wage. Figure 2A depicts the 
equilibrium wage and hiring rate in the formal and informal sectors. Equilibrium points in 
the formal and informal sectors are denoted Ef and Ek, respectively. The feasible wage 
0 ) ; (
' < ⋅ = i i i c λ λ λWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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does not depend on the hiring rate; it is constant at a given wage level. However, the 
bargained wage increases exponentially with the hiring rate reflecting the fact that if 
workers could find jobs without delay wage demands would increase to infinity. The 
hiring rate therefore acts as a discipline device to moderate workers’ wage demands. The 
separation cost reduces the equilibrium wage in the formal sector. But in order for the 
bargained wage to be consistent with this lower wage, workers must have a relatively 
harder time finding jobs there. Hence, job-specific costs reduce the wage and the flow of 
workers through jobs. 
    Figure 2B shows the effect of the separation cost on adjustment to a negative demand 
shock. The initial equilibrium points Ef and Ek from Figure 2A are depicted by the 
intersection of the solid lines for each sector. The formal sector starts at a much lower 
hiring rate than the informal sector because the feasible wage curve intersects the 
bargained wage curve at a lower point. A negative demand shock moves each of the 
feasible wage curves down by an equal amount, moving the equilibrium points to Ef′ and 
Ek′. In the formal sector, the demand shock is absorbed by a much larger fall in the hiring 
rate compared to the informal sector. It follows that, for a given change in employment, 
the separation rate is relatively unaffected. The reverse is true of the informal sector. The 
shock is absorbed mostly in a higher separation rate. 
    Equation (3) suggests a natural empirical test of the model. The parameter β can be 
estimated by regressing hiring and separations in each sector on the stock of employment 
and unemployment over time by ordinary least squares (OLS). Since the model ignores 
adjustment dynamics, we account for them in reduced form by including lags of the 
dependent and independent variables on the right hand side: William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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(4) 
 
The coefficients of this error correction model (ECM) imply the following long-run 
elasticities of hiring and separations with respect to employment and unemployment: 
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The model suggests that the informal sector is more likely to accomplish a given change 
in employment on the destruction margin, that is, by changing the separation rate. This 
implies that the elasticities of hiring and separations in the informal sector with respect to 
employment should be closer to zero and the elasticities with respect to unemployment 
closer to one. To the extent that gross adjustment costs are important in formal sector, the 
elasticities with respect to employment should be closer to one, and the unemployment 
elasticities closer to zero. Where on the interval each sector lies depends on the degree of 
specificity in employment relationships in each sector. In either case, to the extent that 
the assumptions of the model are valid, βi1+βi2 and γi1+γi2 are expected to sum to one. In 
the regressions below, we will compare specifications in which the parameters are 
restricted to sum to one with unrestricted specifications.  
    There are, of course, several caveats. The first is that the model does not address the 
distinction between quits and layoffs, and therefore neither does it address the distinction 
between job and worker flows. All separations are, in effect, layoffs due to job 
destruction, while hires are due to job creation. Roughly speaking, data on worker flows 
capture both job flows and flows of workers through a given set of jobs. Thus, if we 
observe a low flow of workers into unemployment, we cannot be sure whether job 
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destruction is low, whether workers and employers are happier with (or more prone to 
settle for) each other, or whether more workers are skipping unemployment altogether 
and switching directly to other jobs. There are probably good reasons to believe that each 
of these factors work in the direction of lowering flows through unemployment of formal 
sector workers. Employment protection laws make it more costly for firms to fire workers 
and more costly to experiment with new employees (who may one day have to be fired). 
Since firms are less disposed to hiring, currently employed workers are less likely to quit, 
especially if they do not have a new job lined up. Thus, one would expect lower rates of 
job creation and destruction, lower flows of workers through those jobs, and a higher 
fraction of job-to-job flows. To the extent that changes in employment are due to changes 
in the flow of workers through a given set of jobs, the OLS estimates may not be picking 
up the behavioral patterns predicted by the model.
2 Second, not all hiring comes from 
unemployment and not all separations spill workers into the unemployment pool. Thus, 
there are clearly important transitions that the model does not address. Third, flow data 
are notoriously subject to measurement error. Spurious transitions resulting from 
misreporting undoubtedly raise the observed level of transition rates above their actual 
level. To the extent that misreporting varies systematically with the labor market state of 
individuals, the coefficients may be biased, although it is not clear in which direction. 
Finally, there is a selection problem. Firms and workers are likely to sort themselves into 
the labor market most appropriate for their needs and skills. Thus, there are likely to be 
systematic differences in the characteristics of workers and jobs across sectors. We will 
deal with this modestly by running separate regressions by 1-digit industry and by 
                                                 
2 In principle, it is possible to distinguish between worker and job flows, because there exist job flow data 
for Brazil. However, since these data are collected from establishments by the government, they only exist 
for the formal sector, and only for 1996-98 (Corseuil et al, 2002). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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proxies for human capital. In general, however, it is not clear that it is economically 
meaningful to make a distinction between a labor market’s institutional environment and 
the characteristics of workers and jobs that operate in it, unless the distribution of jobs 
and workers could plausibly be thought to be exogenous. However, we are interested in 
the effect of any form of institutional constraint on the operation of the labor market, 
whether these are imposed by labor market regulations or arise endogenously from other 
forms of specific capital. 
 
IV. Data 
    The paper uses 18 years of the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), the Brazilian 
Monthly Employment Survey. The PME has been administered by the Brazilian 
Statistical Agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística, or IBGE) in the six 
largest metropolitan areas of Brazil since 1980.
3 Due to changes in the survey design, 
however, the data are only comparable across years beginning in February 1982. The 
survey is a rotating panel, similar in design to the United States’ Current Population 
Survey. Households are interviewed once a month for four months, dropped from the 
survey for eight months, and then interviewed for four more months. The questionnaire is 
fairly typical: information is collected on labor force activity and demographic variables 
for every member of the household over the age of ten. 
    Crucially for our purposes, workers are asked whether they worked in a regulated or 
unregulated job. In Brazil, all workers have a “work card” which, when signed by an 
employer, gives them protection under the labor laws and covers them under the federal 
                                                 
3 The six metropolitan areas are São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and 
Recife. In the late 1990s, a seventh metropolitan area, Curitiba, was added. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Social Security system. Workers with a signed work card are considered to be in the 
regulated (or formal) sector. Employees whose work card is not signed and self-
employed workers are considered to be in the unregulated (or informal) sector. The 
overhead costs associated with taking on employees with formal labor contracts are 
substantial in Brazil, typically around 70% of a worker's wage. The payroll tax alone 
exceeds 30% and is one of the highest in Latin America. Moreover, many workers prefer 
not to work with signed work cards since their take-home pay may be reduced. 
    Formal and informal jobs do not exist in independent spheres of the economy; on the 
contrary, many employers have both formal and informal employees at the same time, 
particularly in services and “traditional” manufacturing industries. A typical arrangement, 
especially among smaller firms, is to have a core of employees with formal contracts 
while contracts with less essential employees are handled informally. This system also 
works well in dealing with the regulatory authorities, who conduct their business in a 
characteristically Brazilian manner. Regulators more or less take into account that firms 
cannot afford to give all their employees formal contracts, while at the same time 
maintaining an external air of following the guidelines, checking the books, etc. 
(Tokman, 1992) As a result, smaller firms tend to have a larger share of their employees 
working with informal contracts. On the other hand, workers in the large state-owned 
manufacturing firms are almost all unionized and operate mainly with formal contracts 
    Labor flows were constructed by matching individuals across consecutive months, and 
recording their labor force status in each month into one of the following categories: not 
in the labor force (N), unemployed (U), informal employment (K), and formal 
employment (F). There are 16 possible flows (NN, NU, NK, NF, UN, UU, UK, UF, KN, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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KU, KK, KF, FN, FU, FK, FF). These monthly flows were then accumulated into 
quarters. 
    Figure 2 presents average labor flows for the period 1982 to 1998. The first three 
panels show the proportion of workers in employment (E), unemployment (U), and out of 
the labor force (N), as well as the monthly flows between these states. The circles 
represent labor market states, the arrows between them the corresponding flows. The 
numbers not in parentheses are proportions of the total population. Flows were also 
calculated as a proportion of the combined source and destination pools; these 
proportions are in parentheses. The first panel of Figure 1, labeled "Brazil", shows the 
relevant stocks and flows aggregated over the six metropolitan areas in which the 
Brazilian employment survey is administered. For purposes of comparison, the 
corresponding figure for the United Sates data is presented in the second panel, adapted 
from Blanchard and Diamond (1990). In the third panel, the pool of employed workers is 
divided into those with formal labor contracts (F) and those without (K). 
    Although a smaller fraction of the Brazilian population is employed, the ratio of the 
unemployed to the labor force (that is, the unemployment rate) is very similar in both 
countries, around 6%; however, flows between unemployment and employment as a 
proportion of the labor force are less than half as large in Brazil. For example, 
unemployment flows as a proportion of the labor force in São Paulo are roughly half 
those of the United States. On the other hand, flows between employment and out of the 
labor force are similar and flows between unemployment and out of the labor force are 
two to three times higher in the United States. Dividing the pool of employed workers William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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into those with formal and informal labor contracts reveals that flows through 
unemployment are much higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector. 
 
V. Labor Flows 
    Figure 3 plots 3-quarter moving averages of the flow from unemployment to 
employment in each sector as a fraction of the stock of unemployed (Panel A) and 
employed (Panel B), respectively. Figure 4 does the same for the flow out of employment 
into unemployment. For each figure, the transitions of individuals between two 
successive interview months are summed, accumulated into quarters, and divided by the 
relevant stock of (unemployed or employed) individuals in that quarter who were 
matched across months. 
    The exit rate from unemployment into the formal sector, plotted in Figure 3A, is a 
strongly procyclical. It dips sharply in the immediate aftermath of the debt crisis in 1982, 
rising again during the Cruzado Plan in 1986 and then falls precipitously during the trade 
liberalization of the early 1990s. In sharp contrast, hiring as a fraction of formal-sector 
employment maintains a remarkably constant 1 percent over the entire period (Figure 
3B). The reverse is true of the informal sector. Despite the enormous fluctuations in the 
macroeconomic environment during this period, the hiring rate in the informal sector 
remains relatively constant at around 23 percent, implying that an average unemployment 
spell ending in informal employment – whether in recession or recovery – lasts roughly 
four or five months. On the other hand, hiring as a fraction of employment in the informal 
sector is countercyclical. Taken together, Figures 3A and 3B suggest that adjustment in 
the formal and informal sectors could not be more different: to the extent that hiring William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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reflects steady state labor flows, the formal sector relies almost exclusively on the hiring 
rate while the informal sector relies almost exclusively on the separation rate as an 
adjustment mechanism. 
    A very similar pattern occurs in separations, plotted in Figure 4. The flow out of the 
informal sector covaries with unemployment, while the flow out of formal jobs covaries 
with formal sector employment. Note, however, that separations in the formal sector are 
considerably more volatile than hiring. Coincident with trade liberalization in the early 
1990s, the outflow from formal jobs appears to be “pulled” slightly toward the informal 
line. Although the theoretical framework developed above is not equipped to explain this 
(due to the steady state assumption), the relative volatility of separations actually mimics 
a salient feature of the dynamic model of Caballero and Hammour (1996a, 1998). In their 
model, convex adjustment costs associated with job creation require too much adjustment 
to take place on the destruction margin, causing job creation and destruction to become 
decoupled. Thus, job destruction is too volatile, in spite of an inefficiently low level of 
turnover. In the absence of institutional constraints, job creation and destruction are 
highly correlated. This is, in fact, confirmed in the figures. The correlation between 
hiring and separations in the formal sector is only 0.68 compared to 0.98 in the informal 
sector. 
    Figure 5 further disaggregates hiring and separations into manufacturing and services 
employment, to see whether the differences in restructuring patterns are not picking up 
different shocks to which these sectors were exposed. Since much of the macroeconomic 
turmoil in Brazil during this period was external in nature (e.g., exchange rate 
appreciation, trade liberalization), a large component of the shocks were reallocative William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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rather than aggregate demand shocks. Disaggregating clearly has little effect, however. 
Hiring as a fraction of employment in the formal manufacturing sector and formal service 
sector both hover around one percent, although separations are considerably more volatile 
in manufacturing. In the informal sector, hiring and separations follow the same pattern 
in manufacturing and services; however, the level of turnover is clearly lower in the 
service sector and separations in manufacturing are, once again, more volatile. Lower 
turnover in the informal service sector is an interesting finding; it suggests that job-
specific investments not mandated by law are higher in this sector. One reason for this 
may be that labor in formal services is generally less organized than labor in formal 
manufacturing. Due to the heavy presence of the state in the formal manufacturing sector, 
firms outside the state-controlled sector operate on the periphery. In contrast, the formal 
and informal service sectors are more integrated. 
    Table 1 reports estimates of equations (5). There are two dependent variables (hires 
and separations), two samples (formal and informal), and two specifications per sample 
(OLS and ECM). The top and bottom panels show the regressions for the formal and 
informal sectors, respectively. For each dependent variable, the table shows the estimates 
from the basic specification, in which hires and separations in a sector are regressed on 
the contemporaneous stock of unemployment and employment in that sector, as well as 
equilibrium elasticities implied by the coefficients of the ECM. Up to five lags of the 
dependent and independent variables were included. Furthermore, each equation is 
estimated twice: once unrestricted, and again restricting the coefficients to sum to one.
4 
                                                 
4 Restricting the coefficients to sum to one implies, for example, that 
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    Like the figures, the results in Table 1 suggest that very different restructuring 
mechanisms are at work in the formal and informal sectors. The formal sector adjusts 
primarily by adjusting the hiring rate. This shows up in the regressions as a large 
employment elasticity of hiring and separations. In contrast, the informal sector adjusts 
primarily by adjusting the separation rate, which shows up in a large unemployment 
elasticity. In the basic unrestricted specification, the elasticities of hiring and separations 
with respect to employment in the formal sector are 1.1 and 1.0, respectively. That 
compares to an informal sector elasticity with respect to employment of 0.11 for both 
hiring and separations. The corresponding elasticities with respect to unemployment are 
0.23 and 0.15 in the formal sector and 0.91 and 0.93 in the informal sector. Although the 
coefficients sum close to one in the informal sample, the formal sector estimates 
overshoot the mark a bit. The null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients in the basic 
specification equals one is rejected in the formal sector. Restricting the coefficients to 
equal one, the formal-sector employment elasticities become 0.92 for both hiring and 
separations, while the informal unemployment elasticities remain unchanged at 0.91 and 
0.93. 
    Tables 2 and 3 present the same regressions from Table 1 estimated separately for 
manufacturing and services. The same basic result continues to hold, particularly with the 
ECM. The estimated employment elasticity in the basic, unrestricted specification for 
formal manufacturing are somewhat higher than for services: 1.24 for hires and 1.11 for 
separations for formal manufacturing, compared to 0.85 and 0.88 for formal services. The 
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ECM suggests a minimal difference between the two. In the informal sector, the 
unemployment elasticities are 0.75 and 0.77 for manufacturing and 0.86 and 0.96 for 
services, suggesting a slightly more flexible labor market in the service sector. 
    Finally, Table 4 reports the results of estimating the constrained regressions separately 
by sex, education, and age categories. The idea is to separate out the effects of specificity 
related labor market regulations from specific human capital. The estimates are very 
similar for men and women, especially in the formal sector. Surprisingly, the hiring rate 
adjusts more for women than men in the informal sector. In both the formal and informal 
sector, the unemployment elasticity falls with education as expected; however, the 
difference across sectors is still large. For example, workers with less than a primary 
education in the formal sector have an unemployment elasticity of 0.39 and 0.30 for 
hiring and separations, compared to elasticities of 0.82 and 0.79 for the highly educated 
informal sector workers. The regulatory environment appears to account for the major 
differences between the formal and informal sector. Finally, the employment elasticity 
falls instead of rising with age in both sectors, contrary to expectations. 
    Summing up the results of this section, there are five salient points. First, flows 
through the formal sector vary primarily with formal sector employment. This suggests 
that job durations are stable, while the average duration of unemployment spells ending 
in formal sector jobs fluctuates enormously. Second, flows through the informal sector 
vary primarily with unemployment, suggesting that the duration of unemployment spells 
ending in informal jobs is fairly stable over the business cycle. It is job durations that 
vary. Third, separations are more volatile relative to hiring in the formal sector, indicating 
a decoupling of job creation and destruction. Fourth, the differences clearly lie along William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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institutional lines, not along “tradable”/“non-tradable” lines associated with transition. 
Finally, the informal sector does not simply soak up surplus labor during recessions (at 
least not via unemployment). Rather, recessions are associated with intense restructuring. 
In principle, the restructuring mechanisms of both sectors could be compatible with 
similar contributions to unemployment. This question is taken up in the next section. 
 
VI. Changes in Unemployment 
    The restructuring patterns observed in the previous section are, in principle, consistent 
with similar equilibrium unemployment rates. There is a strong presumption in the 
literature, however, that suggests that institutions matter a great deal for the evolution of 
unemployment in response to shocks. The hypothesis is that, if a labor market responds to 
a negative shock by increasing the duration of unemployment rather than its incidence, 
and if the hazard of leaving unemployment is declining over the length of an 
unemployment spell, then a given shock will have longer lasting effects on 
unemployment. A declining exit hazard might result from workers losing skills the longer 
they are out of work, or because firms are more reluctant to hire the long-term 
unemployed. Whatever the reason, the return to equilibrium will be slower. 
    This paper cannot do justice to this argument since the data requires us to assume that 
the hazard of leaving any state of the labor force exhibits no duration dependence. 
Nevertheless, it is informative to isolate the contribution of each sector to the evolution of 
unemployment over time. This can be done by taking the assumptions of no duration 
dependence and steady state very seriously. In this case, the actual distribution of workers 
in the labor force at any point in time can be approximated by the steady-state William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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distribution implied by a Markov matrix of transition probabilities. Movements in the 
labor force can be simulated over time by calculating the implied steady state distribution 
of the sequence of Markov matrices in every period. If these simulations are reasonably 
accurate, we can then isolate movements in unemployment and employment attributable 
to various flows by varying only those flows in the sequence of matrices, holding the 
others constant at some base period.
5 
    Dividing the labor force into three states (formal employment (f), informal 
employment (k), and unemployment (u)), the solution of the corresponding Markov 
system converges in steady state to the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue of 
one.
6 Normalizing this eigenvector so that its components sum to one yields the implied 
steady state distribution of the labor force: 
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where the λij denote transition probabilities from state i to state j, and Γ is a function that 
normalizes each element to a share of the total labor force, f+k+u. 
    Panel A of Figure 6 shows the results of the simulation. Movements in the labor force 
are reasonably well approximated by a Markov process. The predicted share of formal 
employment is a few percentage points too high during the 1980s, and the predicted share 
of informal employment too low. But the predicted unemployment rate tracks the actual 
unemployment rate quite well. 
                                                 
5 This technique has been used by Pissarides (1986) and Abraham and Shimer (2001) in a different context. 
6 By omitting the fourth state, out-of-the-labor-force (n), from the Markov process we have implicitly 
assumed that λin=0 and λni=1, for i=f,k,u. When this condition fails to hold, as it clearly must, the implied 
steady-state employment distribution will be incorrect. However, the three-state Markov process omitting n 
still has considerably more predictive power than the unwieldy four-state Markov process including 
transitions through n. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
  28
    In Panel B of Figure 6, the evolution of the predicted unemployment rate is 
decomposed into changes attributable to each of three sets of flows: flows between the 
formal sector and unemployment, flows between the informal sector and unemployment, 
and direct transitions between the formal and informal sectors. For example, changes in 
unemployment attributable to formal sector-unemployment flows are estimated by 
calculating the steady states implied by the sequence of Markov matrices holding λfk, λkf, 
λuk, and λku constant at their average 1982 level. 
    Both the formal- and informal-unemployment flows contribute substantially to 
fluctuations in the unemployment rate. But the secular rise in unemployment in the wake 
of liberalization and stabilization during the 1990s appears to be purely a result of lower 
entry into the formal sector. Changes in unemployment due to the informal-
unemployment flow exhibit no trend; they are merely countercyclical. Of course, this 
may be simply because the industries intensive in formal jobs were the ones exposed to 
the biggest shocks, and this was certainly the case. 
    To gauge the extent to which differences in shocks may be driving the results, it would 
be nice to perform the same exercise disaggregating the labor force further into the 
manufacturing and service sectors; however, predicting labor force movements using a 
Markov process becomes a rather unwieldy exercise when the population is split up into 
more than three sectors, and it quickly loses its predictive power. For this reason, I 
perform the exercise on subsets of the labor force. Specifically, I look separately at the 
manufacturing and service sectors, looking at movements in formal and informal 
employment shares within each, as well as unemployment. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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    The “labor force” shares predicted by the Markov process, plotted in Panel A of Figure 
7 (for manufacturing) and Figure 8 (for services), are still fairly successful in tracking 
actual employment shares, though less so for the service sector than the manufacturing 
sector. Looking again at contributions to changes in unemployment, this time for 
manufacturing alone (Figure 7, Panel B), lower entry into formal manufacturing jobs is 
clearly the dominant factor behind the secular rise in unemployment in the 1990s; the 
informal sector adds only a mild countercyclical component to unemployment. 
Interestingly, rising direct transitions from the formal to the informal sector contributed 
steadily to rising unemployment. This suggests that the informal sector is actually 
responsible for a higher level of unemployment, despite a smaller contribution to changes 
in unemployment. Panel B of Figure 8 shows the contribution of service sector flows to 
the evolution of unemployment. Unemployment did not rise by nearly as much relative to 
the rising service sector; nevertheless, the same pattern continues to hold. Lower entry 
into the formal service sector caused unemployment to rise to a higher level in the 1990s, 
while the informal sector obeyed its countercyclical pattern. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
    Employment protection lowers the flow of jobs and workers through the labor market. 
Job stability for the employed comes at the expense of the unemployed, who must wait 
longer to get jobs. The evidence from the Brazilian labor market suggests that 
employment protection also causes adjustment to demand fluctuations to come at the 
expense of the unemployed. A reduction in employment in the regulated labor market is 
achieved by lowering the rate at which the unemployed get jobs. In the unregulated William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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market, the same reduction is achieved by raising the separation rate. Recessions in an 
unregulated labor market are times of intense restructuring, but are otherwise no different 
from booms from the perspective of an unemployed worker. In contrast, recessions in a 
regulated labor market are times of hard luck for the unemployed. 
    Which is the more efficient adjustment mechanism depends on the productivity of the 
least productive workers with jobs compared to the productivity of the most productive 
unemployed workers. Caballero and Hammour (1996b) argue that, if the regulatory 
environment distorts efficient job creation incentives, a strong case can be made for job 
creation subsidies. These will not only offset the reductions in job creation with which 
this sector responds to negative demand shocks, but will also encourage scrapping of 
outmoded production units through pressure on wages. However, although the cyclical 
patterns documented in this paper are consistent with Caballero and Hammour, several 
pieces of evidence argue against this view. First, Gonzaga (1998) has linked high rates of 
job turnover observed in Brazil’s formal sector to low job quality and has suggested that 
Brazil’s labor laws actually encourage turnover at the expense of investments in specific 
human capital. As we have seen in this paper, however, turnover in the formal sector is 
still considerably lower than in the informal sector. Nevertheless, the evidence seems to 
indicate that turnover in Brazil is, if anything, already too high. Second, productivity in 
the formal manufacturing sector increased dramatically in the 1990s in Brazil, and 
throughout Latin America (Katz, 2000; Hay, 2001), so it is not obvious that the 
restructuring mechanisms observed in this paper for the formal sector hampered efficient 
adjustment in the wake of the liberalization and stabilization reforms. Such an assertion 
would require knowledge of the change in productivity that would have taken place had William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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the formal sector restructured without regulations. How to reconcile all of these facts is 
something of a puzzle, and suggests that the productivity consequences of employment 
protection remain an important topic for future research. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Formal Sector
Dependent Variable (Flow): log UF Dependent Variable (Flow): log FU
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a
log F 1.10 1.31 0.92 1.03 1.00 1.19 0.92 1.05
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
log U 0.23 0.29 0.08 -0.03 0.15 0.09 0.08 -0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant -9.70 -4.52 -6.49 -4.28
(1.28) (0.15) (1.01) (0.11)
R
2 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.84 0.83
SBC
b 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 -3.82 -4.44 -4.35
D-W 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 1.35 2.04 2.02
Informal Sector
Dependent Variable (Flow): log UK Dependent Variable (Flow): log KU
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a
log K 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
log U 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant -2.08 -1.68 -2.70 -1.93
(0.61) (0.07) (0.92) (0.10)
R
2 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.83
SBC
b -5.32 -5.24 -5.28 -4.51 -4.51 -4.49
D-W 1.47 2.01 2.02 1.73 2.05 2.04
b Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion: SBC=ln(e'e)/n+(k/n)*ln(n), where e'e is the sum of squared residuals, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of parameters.
F=formal sector, K=informal sector, U=unemployment, FU, UF, KU, UK denote flows between sectors
Restricted regressions are parameterized so that the coefficients add up to one.
Table 1. Estimated Employment and Unemployment Elasticities of Flows Through 
Unemployment, Formal and Informal Sectors
a Steady-state regressions include only contemporaneous regressors. Error Correction Model (ECM) regressions include up to 5 lags of the dependent and independent variables. The 
results in the table reflect the implied long-run elasticities from these regressions.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Formal Manufacturing
Dependent Variable (Flow): log UF Dependent Variable (Flow): log FU
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a
log F 1.24 1.31 1.10 1.03 1.11 1.19 1.08 1.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
log U 0.18 0.29 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.05
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Constant -10.98 -4.79 -5.93 -4.46
(1.45) (0.08) (1.14) (0.06)
R
2 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.83
SBC
b -2.81 -3.16 -2.36 -2.90 -3.30 -3.75 -3.33 -3.75
D-W 1.59 1.99 1.41 2.14 1.31 1.99 1.25 2.00
Informal Manufacturing
Dependent Variable (Flow): log UK Dependent Variable (Flow): log KU
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a
log K 0.36 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.07
(0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07)
log U 0.75 0.92 0.73 0.93 0.77 0.93 0.77 0.93
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant -4.89 -3.41 -4.09 -3.83
(1.35) (0.04) (1.21) (0.04)
R
2 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.83
SBC
b -3.27 -3.47 -3.31 -3.50 -3.50 -3.49 -3.55 -3.52
D-W 1.11 2.30 1.07 2.32 1.56 2.04 1.56 2.01
b Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion: SBC=ln(e'e)/n+(k/n)*ln(n), where e'e is the sum of squared residuals, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of parameters.
F=formal sector, K=informal sector, U=unemployment, FU, UF, KU, UK denote flows between sectors
Restricted regressions are parameterized so that the coefficients add up to one.
Table 2. Estimated Employment and Unemployment Elasticities of Flows Through 
Unemployment, Formal and Informal Sectors
a Steady-state regressions include only contemporaneous regressors. Error Correction Model (ECM) regressions include up to 5 lags of the dependent and independent variables. The 
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Formal Services
Dependent Variable (Flow): log UF Dependent Variable (Flow): log FU
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a
log F 0.85 1.13 0.79 0.86 0.88 1.00 0.83 0.99
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
log U 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant -5.89 -4.58 -5.40 -4.46
(1.40) (0.11) (1.20) (0.09)
R
2 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.84 0.83
SBC
b 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 -3.82 -4.44 -4.35
D-W 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 1.35 2.04 2.02
Informal Services
Dependent Variable (Flow): log UK Dependent Variable (Flow): log KU
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a Steady-State
a ECM
a
log K 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.26 0.14 0.05
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06)
log U 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.86 0.96 0.86 0.95
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant -2.57 -2.41 -3.84 -2.85
(0.70) (0.06) (0.95) (0.08)
R
2 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.83
SBC
b -5.32 -5.24 -5.28 -4.51 -4.51 -4.49
D-W 1.47 2.01 2.02 1.73 2.05 2.04
b Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion: SBC=ln(e'e)/n+(k/n)*ln(n), where e'e is the sum of squared residuals, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of parameters.
F=formal sector, K=informal sector, U=unemployment, FU, UF, KU, UK denote flows between sectors
Restricted regressions are parameterized so that the coefficients add up to one.
Table 3. Estimated Employment and Unemployment Elasticities of Flows Through 
Unemployment, Formal and Informal Sectors
a Steady-state regressions include only contemporaneous regressors. Error Correction Model (ECM) regressions include up to 5 lags of the dependent and independent variables. The 
results in the table reflect the implied long-run elasticities from these regressions.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Formal Sector
Dep Var: log UF Dep Var: log FU
log F logU log F log U
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Sex
Men 1.10 (0.07) 0.22 (0.07) 0.99 (0.06) 0.16 (0.06)
Women 1.03 (0.10) 0.28 (0.08) 0.95 (0.08) 0.15 (0.06)
Education
Less than primary 1.07 (0.07) 0.39 (0.08) 1.02 (0.07) 0.30 (0.08)
Primary 1.17 (0.08) 0.28 (0.09) 1.05 (0.07) 0.27 (0.08)
More than primary 1.05 (0.09) 0.15 (0.07) 0.94 (0.07) 0.08 (0.05)
Age
10 to 29 1.08 (0.07) 0.22 (0.07) 1.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06)
30 to 44 0.94 (0.08) 0.26 (0.06) 0.85 (0.07) 0.26 (0.06)
45 and over 0.84 (0.14) 0.34 (0.07) 0.62 (0.13) 0.38 (0.07)
Informal Sector
log UK log KU
log K logU log K log U
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Sex
Men 0.09 (0.05) 0.91 (0.03) 0.09 (0.08) 0.96 (0.05)
Women 0.22 (0.07) 0.91 (0.05) 0.27 (0.09) 0.82 (0.06)
Education
Less than primary 0.06 (0.04) 0.96 (0.03) 0.05 (0.07) 0.94 (0.05)
Primary 0.03 (0.05) 0.94 (0.04) -0.04 (0.09) 0.94 (0.06)
More than primary 0.15 (0.04) 0.82 (0.03) 0.30 (0.07) 0.79 (0.06)
Age
10 to 29 0.30 (0.06) 0.81 (0.04) 0.25 (0.07) 0.82 (0.05)
30 to 44 0.06 (0.06) 0.98 (0.04) -0.02 (0.10) 1.08 (0.06)
45 and over -0.06 (0.08) 0.95 (0.04) 0.10 (0.11) 1.00 (0.05)
Significance levels: 1% (***), 5%(**), 10%(*)
F=formal sector, K=informal sector, U=unemployment, FU, UF, KU, UK denote flows between sectors
Table 4. Regression Estimates of Labor Flows Through Unemployment on 
Source and Destination Stocks, by Sex, Education, and AgeWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Source: PME
Figure 1. Labor Force Trends in Brazil, 1982-2000
A. Employment Shares of the Labor Force
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Figure 3. Average Stocks and Flows Between Labor Market States 
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Source: PME. Numbers not in parentheses are proportions of the total population. Numbers in parentheses are proportions of the 
source and destination pools. 
 
*Based on data for six Brazilian cities: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, and Recife. 
** Based on a figure in Blanchard and Diamond (1990).     William Davidson Institute Working Paper 484 
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Figure 4: Flows from unemployment to employment, formal and informal sectors, 
3-quarter moving averages, Brazil, 1982-99
A. Hiring as a fraction of unemployment
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Figure 5: Flows from employment to unemployment, formal and informal sectors, 
3-quarter moving averages, Brazil, 1982-99
A. Separations as a fraction of unemployment
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Figure 6. Hires and separations as a fraction of employment, by sector, 3-
quarter moving averages, Brazil, 1982-99
A. Hiring as a fraction of employment
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F=formal employment, K=informal employment U=unemployment. Flows between states are indicated by UF, FU, UK, KU, etc.
Predicted shares are those predicted by a Markov process.
Counterfactual shares are caculated by holding all flows except those indicated constant at the 1982 level.
Figure 7. Counterfactual Changes in Unemployment, by Sector
A. Actual and Predicted Labor Force Shares
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F=formal employment, K=informal employment, U=unemployment. Flows between states are indicated by UF, FU, UK, KU, etc.
Predicted shares are those predicted by a Markov process.
Counterfactual shares are caculated by holding all flows except those indicated constant at the 1982 level.
Figure 8. Counterfactual Changes in Unemployment by Type of Contract, 
Manufacutring Sector
I. Actual and Predicted Labor Force Shares
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F=formal employment, K=informal employment U=unemployment. Flows between states are indicated by UF, FU, UK, KU, etc.
Predicted shares are those predicted by a Markov process.
Counterfactual shares are caculated by holding all flows except those indicated constant at the 1982 level.
Figure 9. Counterfactual Changes in Unemployment by Type of Contract, 
Service Sector
A. Actual and Predicted Labor Force Shares
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